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Abstract 
Distributed ledger technology (DLT), including 
blockchain, enables secure processing of transac-
tions between untrustworthy parties in a decentral-
ized system. However, DLT is available in different 
designs that exhibit diverse characteristics. Moreo-
ver, DLT characteristics have complementary and 
conflicting interdependencies. Hence, there will nev-
er be an ideal DLT design for all DLT use cases; 
instead, DLT implementations need to be configured 
to contextual requirements. Successful DLT configu-
ration requires, however, a sound understanding of 
DLT characteristics and their interdependencies. In 
this manuscript, we review DLT characteristics and 
organize them into six groups. Furthermore, we con-
dense interdependencies of DLT characteristics into 
trade-offs that should be considered for successful 
deployment of DLT. Finally, we consolidate our find-
ings into DLT archetypes for common design objec-
tives, such as security, usability, or performance. Our 
work makes extant DLT research more transparent 
and fosters understanding of interdependencies and 
trade-offs between DLT characteristics. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Distributed ledger technology (DLT), including 
blockchain, enables secure transactions between un-
trustworthy parties through algorithm-based consen-
sus. The automated consensus finding eliminates the 
need for third-party trust enforcement. DLT is prom-
ising to automate and speed up information pro-
cessing while simultaneously decreasing transaction 
cost. Consequently, organizations from diverse indus-
tries have strong interest in the application of DLT in 
domains such as supply chain management [1], micro 
and smart grids [2], and internet-of-things (IoT) [3]. 
Due to differences in application domains, corre-
sponding DLT use cases come with context-
depended requirements that necessitate individual 
configuration of DLT characteristics [4]. Exemplary 
context-depended requirements are high scalability 
[3, 5], high throughput [3, 6], fast (micro) transac-
tions, and a high level of anonymity [3, 7] or security 
[8, 9]. The configuration of DLT characteristics to 
meet such context-depended requirements is becom-
ing a key challenge for the improvement of DLT 
concepts and concrete DLT designs. 
However, DLT characteristics are highly depend-
ent on each other. Thus, improving certain DLT 
characteristics will deteriorate other DLT characteris-
tics. For instance, Bitcoin is well known for its high 
availability and resilience with respect to fraud due to 
its high number of participating nodes. On the other 
hand, Bitcoin suffers from low throughput (only sev-
en transactions per second) and from low energy effi-
ciency due to proof-of-work consensus finding. This 
makes Bitcoin, for instance, unsuitable for the IoT 
domain, which requires an ever-increasing transac-
tion speed. In contrast, HyperLedger Fabric is capa-
ble of 3,500 transactions per second on average but 
lacks high scalability and supports only a small set of 
nodes, which reduces availability and resilience com-
pared to Bitcoin. Consequently, DLT developers are 
currently struggling with the interdependencies of 
DLT characteristics and resulting trade-offs that need 
to be tackled when designing and developing DLT. 
Extant research on DLT can mainly be distin-
guished into three streams: First, application of DLT 
for several use cases [3]; second, classification and 
(formal) description of DLT designs [10]; third, fur-
ther development of DLT concepts and designs [11]. 
Within these streams, extant research focuses mostly 
on tailoring DLT to specific contexts and employs a 
particular DLT design to meet the requirements in the 
chosen context. Trade-offs resulting from interde-
pendencies between DLT characteristics are often 
neglected and not further investigated. Consequently, 
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interdependencies and resulting trade-offs between 
DLT characteristics remain unclear. Because of the 
inseparable and interwoven nature of DLT character-
istics, a holistic view on the interaction and mutual 
interdependencies of DLT characteristics is necessary 
to understand resulting constraints on the usefulness 
of specific DLT designs in different domains. The 
objective of our research is to identify trade-offs be-
tween DLT characteristics by answering the follow-
ing research question: 
RQ: What trade-offs result from interdependen-
cies of DLT characteristics? 
To answer the research question, we first provide 
a comprehensive overview of DLT characteristics by 
surveying prior literature. Then, we identify and dis-
cuss trade-offs of DLT characteristics. Finally, we 
consolidate our findings into archetypes of prominent 
DLT designs. These DLT archetypes are useful to 
assess DLT designs with respect to suitability for 
particular DLT use cases. 
Our work makes extant DLT research more trans-
parent and fosters understanding of interdependencies 
and trade-offs between DLT characteristics. This is 
useful to select fitting DLT configurations for certain 
uses cases, to estimate likely limitations and con-
straints, and to gauge the risks coming with the 
choice of a particular DLT design. 
The remainder of this manuscript is structured as 
follows. In section 2 related research are presented. 
Subsequently, the employed methodology is de-
scribed in section 3. We present an overview of the 
identified DLT characteristics and trade-offs in sec-
tion 4. In section 5, we discuss our results, present 
archetypes for DLT designs, and conclude with im-
plications and directions for future research. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
2.1 Distributed ledger technology 
 
DLT facilitates consensus finding in a distributed 
ledger maintained by a decentralized network. Each 
node in the decentralized network stores, shares, and 
synchronizes digital data [12]. 
Digital data to be included in the ledger is submit-
ted by users in form of transactions. A new transac-
tion is received by a single node of the distributed 
ledger, which forwards the transaction to each node 
in the network. Depending on the DLT design, validi-
ty of transactions is assessed by a member of nodes 
participating in the ledger [12]. After a transaction is 
validated, it is appended to the distributed ledger. As 
transactions and its corresponding data can only be 
appended to the distributed ledger, it is hard to alter 
the data retroactively. Thus, a basic DLT characteris-
tic is its high degree of integrity, which ensures im-
mutability of recorded data. 
DLT includes different DLT concepts, which 
mainly differ in the way transactions are validated 
and stored. Some popular DLT concepts are block-
chain [12], block directed acyclic graphs (blockDAG) 
[3], and transaction-based directed acyclic graphs 
(TDAG) [3]. The DLT concept blockchain, for ex-
ample, is employed by Bitcoin and Ethereum, yet 
they differ from each other in their DLT design, 
which is a concrete implementation of a DLT con-
cept. Although all DLT designs have DLT properties 
including security and performance [3, 10, 13, 14, 
15], each DLT design has individual configurations 
of DLT characteristics. A DLT characteristic is a 
characteristic, which is configurable and crucial to a 
DLT design’s suitability for given use cases. 
Figure 1 provides a visualization of the differ-
ences between DLT concepts, designs, and character-
istics, which are associated with DLT properties. In 
addition, current development on DLT is illustrated 
in Figure 2, highlighting the relations between DLT 
concepts, DLT designs, DLT characteristics and the 
corresponding DLT properties. 
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Figure 1. Schematic overview about the DLT 
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Figure 2. Current DLT development cycle for the 
improvement of DLT 
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2.2 Related work 
 
Extant research on DLT can be distinguished into 
three main streams: Application of DLT in several 
use cases, classification and (formal) description of 
DLT designs, and improvements on and further de-
velopments of DLT concepts and DLT designs. Use 
cases and implemented DLT applications offer in-
sights on application requirements and on constraints 
imposed due to chosen DLT designs [1, 6, 16]. In the 
second stream, taxonomies, classifications and anal-
yses of DLT designs, which offer an overview about 
commonalities and differences of DLT designs with 
respect to DLT characteristics, are developed [9, 10, 
17, 18, 19, 20]. Additionally, analysis of DLT de-
signs reveals scenarios for successful attacks such as 
balance attacks [18] or selfish-mining [17]. However, 
these analysis focus on single implications and do not 
provide an overview of other implications. Last, fur-
ther development focuses further improvement of 
existing DLT designs and developing evaluation 
frameworks for DLT designs. 
Previous literature focuses on increasing the suit-
ability of DLT designs for specific use cases. Hence, 
trade-offs between DLT characteristics are often intu-
itively accepted and not thoroughly examined. Con-
straints of DLT designs are listed but causes, interde-
pendencies and trade-offs between DLT characteris-
tics are not investigated. These trade-offs strongly 
influence a DLT design’s suitability for a particular 
use case. It is crucial to investigate (unintended) ef-
fects of particular configurations on DLT characteris-
tics on other DLT characteristics. We provide an 
overview of DLT characteristics that determine the 
suitability of DLT designs for particular use-cases. 
Built on the identified DLT characteristics, we then 
discuss causes that induce trade-offs between DLT 
characteristics. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
We apply a two-step research approach. We first 
conduct a literature review to extract DLT character-
istics. Our descriptive literature review [21] was 
guided by recommendations for literature reviews in 
the information systems domain [22, 23, 24]. We 
analyze DLT characteristics in detail to identify 
trade-offs in DLT designs. 
 
3.1 Literature review 
 
To identify publications addressing DLT charac-
teristics, we searched scientific databases that we 
deemed representative for the identification of DLT 
characteristics and related interdependencies as they 
cover a wide range of journals and conferences (i.e., 
they cover the top computer science and information 
systems journals and conferences): ACM Digital Li-
brary, EBSCOhost, IEEE Xplore, ProQuest, and Sci-
enceDirect. To cover a broad set of publications, we 
searched each database with the following string in 
title, abstracts and keywords: (blockchain* OR (dis-
tributed AND ledger*)). We limited our search to 
peer-reviewed articles to ensure high quality of arti-
cles. We identified 1,144 articles in this initial search. 
To identify and filter articles, we first checked the 
relevance of each article by analyzing title, abstract, 
and keywords. If any indication for relevance ap-
peared, the article was marked for further analysis. 
We excluded articles that were duplicates (62), grey 
literature (i.e., editorials, unfinished manuscripts, 
dissertations) and books (18), not applicable to our 
study (56) or not available in English (31). This first 
relevancy assessment resulted in a sample of 977 
articles deemed to be potentially relevant. After-
wards, a fine-grained relevance validation was made 
by reading the articles in detail, resulting in a final 
sample of 195 relevant articles. In this second rele-
vance assessment, we excluded articles that do not 
relate to suitability of DLT characteristics for various 
use cases (706) or non-research articles (76).  
 
3.2 Data analysis 
 
Our data analysis followed an approach proposed 
by Lacity et al. [25]. As a first step, we carefully read 
and analyzed relevant articles to identify the consid-
ered DLT characteristics. We recorded for each ex-
tracted DLT characteristic a name, a description and 
the original source [25]. In total, 277 DLT character-
istics were extracted. A list of so-called master varia-
bles was created to aggregate the identified DLT 
characteristics [25]. A master variable is an aggrega-
tion of similar, DLT characteristics consisting of a 
name and a description (see the bootstrapping ap-
proach in [26]). If an identified DLT characteristic 
fitted into an existing master variable, we assigned it 
accordingly; otherwise, a new master variable was 
created. During this process, we applied the coding 
rules proposed by Lacity et al. [25]. Since different 
people often put the same labels on different things 
and vice versa, it is crucial for the validity of a quali-
tative analysis to avoid semantic ambiguities (i.e., 
different terminology for same concepts) [27]. For 
example, we aggregated the DLT characteristics 
“immutability” and “tamper-resistance” to the master 
variable “integrity”. To ensure that we identified a 
reliable set of master variables, we aimed for theoret-
ical saturation [28, 29], that is, the point when no new 
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findings are gained in further articles. After complet-
ing the analysis of 50 articles, randomly selected out 
of the 195 relevant articles, we noticed that no new 
master variable emerged in the last 16 articles. Given 
this high number of articles that did not lead to the 
identification of any new master variable in our liter-
ature review, we were confident to have reached satu-
ration and therefore stopped our literature review. We 
finalized the list of master variables by reviewing all 
assignments. To ease understanding, we use the term 
DLT characteristics for the identified master varia-
bles in the following, as they represent an aggrega-
tion of similar DLT characteristics. 
We applied an inductive approach grouping DLT 
characteristics by objectives and application contexts. 
For instance, DLT characteristics were grouped into 
the DLT property security if they were related to 
common security topics such as availability and con-
fidentiality. 
Subsequently, trade-offs between DLT character-
istics were extracted from the literature. Especially 
constrains on DLT designs and their specific origins 
were analyzed. Furthermore, interdependencies be-
tween characteristics were coded and structured to 
examine trade-offs between DLT characteristics, 
even if the underlying interdependencies are not ob-
vious. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 DLT characteristics 
 
Our study identified 37 DLT characteristics, 
which determine the suitability of DLT designs for 
specific contextual requirements. These DLT charac-
teristics are described in Table 2. The inductive 
grouping of DLT characteristics resulted in the six 
DLT properties summarized in Table 1. These DLT 
properties are crucial for all examined DLT designs. 
 
4.2 Trade-offs between DLT characteristics 
 
DLT characteristics have interdependencies, and 
can either be complementary (e.g., a high level of 
transparency supports auditability) or conflicting 
(e.g., high availability requires multiple replications 
of the ledger but comes with the cost of decreased 
consistency). Interdependencies between DLT char-
acteristics result in trade-offs, which constitute an 
improvement of one DLT characteristic at the cost of 
deteriorating another DLT characteristic. Therefore, 
trade-offs between DLT characteristics result in con-
straints on the applicability of DLT designs for cer-
tain use cases. 
Security vs. Institutionalization 
Confidentiality vs. Auditability. A high degree of 
confidentiality comes with granular access rights to 
saved data, which impedes auditability of transaction 
contents due to a loss of transparency [35]. 
Vulnerability Resistance vs. Auditability. In dis-
tributed ledgers using equity tokens (e.g., cryptocur-
rencies) it is crucial to be able to determine the cur-
rent amount of equity tokens in the system to discern 
value of the equity tokens. Strong encryption of 
transactions, which are used to reconstruct the 
amount of equity tokens owned by users, enables a 
low level of transparency but impedes auditability. 
Hence, the total number of equity tokens becomes 
hard to determine, which makes hacks on the amount 
of equity tokens also hard to detect. 
Security vs. Usability 
Availability vs. Costs. High availability is reached 
by a high number of replications of the ledger on 
several nodes. Reducing costs by reducing the num-
ber of nodes results in a reduction of the number of 
replications of the distributed ledger and weakens 
availability. A high number of replications is current-
ly reached in public, unpermissioned blockchains 
because any node can join the distributed ledger. 
However, public blockchains also come with higher 
transaction fees than private or permissioned block-
chains [33] resulting in higher overall costs for users. 
Security vs. Security 
Consistency vs. Availability. Distributed database 
theory reveals a trade-off between consistency and 
availability—the CAP Theorem [34]. This trade-off 
persists in the field of DLT and is caused by latency 
in block propagation, for example, due to big block 
sizes or network failures. The larger the number of 
Table 1. Identified DLT properties 
Security (181 occurrences) 
Preservation of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
information [30]. 
Performance (92 occurrences) 
The accomplishment of a given task measured against 
standards of accuracy, completeness, costs, and speed. 
Usability (51 occurrences) 
The extent to which a DLT design can be used by specified 
users to achieve specified goals with respect to effective-
ness, efficiency, and satisfaction in a context of use [31]. 
Development Flexibility (34 occurrences) 
The possibilities offered by a DLT design for maintenance 
and further development. 
Level of Anonymity (23 occurrences) 
The degree to which individuals are not identifiable within 
a set of subjects [32]. 
Institutionalization (16 occurrences) 
The emerging embedding of concepts and artifacts (here 
DLT) in social structures. 
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nodes that must receive new transactions, the longer 
the distributed ledger is in an inconsistent state. 
Performance vs. Security 
Block Size vs. Consistency. An increased block 
size comes with a higher block propagation delay 
resulting in a longer state of inconsistency between 
nodes in a distributed ledger. This trade-off has also 
been found in the field of distributed databases [65]. 
Block Size vs. Integrity. In distributed ledgers us-
ing blocks, block propagation delays are strongly 
influenced by block size [3]. The longer the block 
propagation delay, the higher is the probability of 
new forks [15]. Forks increase the probability of im-
mutability breaches [67] caused by attacks such as 
selfish-mining [61], which impede integrity. 
Block Size vs. Vulnerability Resistance. By in-
creasing block size in a block-based distributed ledg-
er, more transactions can be stored in a single block, 
which causes longer block propagation delays [3] and 
increased required bandwidth [53]. Highly varying 
loads on the distributed ledger caused by variations 
on transaction frequency result in block size varia-
tions, which cause variations in block propagation 
delay in the network [45]. Variations in block propa-
gation delay increase the probability of successful 
selfish-mining attacks thereby threatening security 
[17, 61]. Selfish-mining attacks describe a phenome-
non where a pool of nodes mines its own branch of a 
blockchain without publishing their blocks to the 
main branch until their selfish-mined branch would 
be chosen as future main branch by the particular 
fork resolution rules [61]. Thus, the mining pool can 
revert blockchain contents. 
 
Table 2. DLT characteristics grouped by DLT properties 
Prop DLT Characteristics 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Availability. Availability is the probability that a system can be accessed when needed [15]. 
Confidentiality. Prevention of unauthorized information access and release [36, 37, 38]. 
Consistency. Strong consistency means that all nodes store the same data in their ledger at the same time [39]. 
Integrity. Integrity requires that information is protected against unauthorized modification or deletion as well as irrevo-
cable, accidental, and undesired changes by authorized users [3, 40, 41]. 
Level of Encryption. The level of security concerning the application of authentication-related cryptographic primitives 
in, for example, creation of public/private-key pairs and authentication for transaction authentication [42, 43]. 
Level of Decentralization. The number of independent nodes participating in transaction validation and consensus find-
ing [3, 14]. 
Level of Trust towards Nodes. The level of how trustworthy each node in the distributed network is [44, 45]. 
Likelihood of Forks. A fork is the existence of a branch besides the main branch of a distributed ledger [17, 18]. 
Non-Repudiation. Entities involved in a communication cannot deny having participated in all or part of the communica-
tion [15, 33, 46]. 
Partition Tolerance. The system continues to operate correctly even if an arbitrary number of messages is dropped (or 
delayed) by the network [40]. 
Resilience. The ability to return to a (previous) state after the occurrence of some event or action which may have 
changed that state [47]. 
Vulnerability Resistance. The system’s degree of vulnerability to targeted attacks [48]. 
P
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
 
Block Creation Interval. The time between the creation of consecutive blocks (only in DLT designs using blocks) [15]. 
Block Size. The size of data that is stored in a block [7, 15]. 
Energy Efficiency. A number expressing the relative efficiency of a tool, such as the number of validated transactions, 
that is obtained by dividing the tool's output per hour by its energy requirement in watts that is consumed by computation 
for processes, such as mining and transaction validation [9]. 
Propagation Delay. Latency between the submission of a transaction (or block) and the point in time where each node 
received the transaction [3, 42]. 
Required Bandwidth. The bandwidth the DLT design’s protocol requires for necessary data exchanges over the decen-
tralized network [49]. 
Scalability. The capability of a DLT design to handle an increasing amount of workload or its potential to be enlarged to 
accommodate that growth [5, 50]. 
Throughput. The number of transactions validated and appended to the ledger in a given time interval [5, 8, 39, 51]. 
Transaction Validation Speed. Duration required for verifying transaction validity [8, 42]. 
U
sa
b
il
it
y
 
Costs. Costs related to the implementation and usage of a DLT design, including software development and operational 
costs [52, 53, 54, 55]. 
Ease of Node Adoption. The ease of preparing a new or failed device to be added to the DLT design in the role of a vali-
dating node or a consuming terminal device [44, 56, 57]. 
Ease of Use. The ability to easily access and work with the DLT design [57, 58]. 
Support for Constrained Devices. The extent to which constrained devices, such as those used in the IoT, can participate 
in a DLT, for instance, by issuing or validating transactions [6, 59, 60]. 
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Block Creation Interval vs. Level of Decentraliza-
tion. In Proof-of-Work, a long block creation interval 
leads to less often rewards in total and decreased like-
lihood of rewards for individual miners. This con-
tributes to high variance in received payments for 
miners. Hence, it is more likely that nodes will join 
mining pools to increase the probability to receive 
rewards from mining. This leads to a decreased level 
of decentralization. 
Throughput vs. Integrity. Higher throughput can 
be reached by a smaller set of verified nodes that 
validate transactions. Hence, a small number of 
known nodes makes it easier to have detailed infor-
mation on the network graph. Access to a detailed 
network topology facilitates initiation of targeted 
delays in the communication between nodes because 
the data flow is known [18]. Thus, the probability for 
successful balance attacks [18] increases in forkable 
DLT designs. Balance attack can be defined as the 
process of transiently disrupting communications 
between subgroups of miners with equal mining 
power [18]. During the communications is disrupted, 
transactions can be submitted to one subgroup while 
mining new blocks in another subgroup. The attack-
er’s aim is to outweigh the blockchain branch she 
submitted transactions to with the blockchain branch 
she participates in the mining process. As a result, the 
ledger may be rewritten [18]. Balance attacks raise 
the probability for successful double-spending, which 
violates a ledger’s immutability. Increased vulnera-
bility to immutability violations reduces the integrity 
of a distributed ledger. 
Throughput vs. Partition Tolerance. By decreas-
ing the number of validating nodes in DLT designs 
using blocks, faster consensus algorithms (e.g., Prac-
tical Byzantine Fault Tolerance), which scale well, 
can be applied instead of slow consensus mechanisms 
such as Proof-of-Work. On the other hand, decreas-
ing the number of validating nodes in a distributed 
ledger reduces its partition tolerance because less 
nodes forward new transactions to foreign nodes. 
Development Flexibility vs. Performance. 
Smart Contract Support vs. Required Bandwidth. 
The more complex smart contracts are and the more 
functionality they must provide, the more likely is an 
increase in the required size of a transaction data 
storage. Hence, the required bandwidth must increase 
to prevent decreased consistency. 
Smart Contract Support vs. Transaction Valida-
tion Speed. The support for more expressive pro-
gramming languages enables development of smart 
contracts providing a broad range of functionality. 
The more functionality is added to a smart contract, 
the higher becomes its complexity, ultimately imped-
ing DLT performance because the required execution 
time and, consequently, the time required for transac-
tion validation increases [49]. A smart contract’s 
complexity may be dramatically increased by using 
external data sources (e.g., from an oracle). The used 
compiler further influences the smart contract’s 
runtime. This is because a compiler translates human-
readable code into machine code. The resulting ma-
chine code should be executable by a computer as 
fast as possible [56, 68]. 
Table 2 continued. DLT characteristics grouped by DLT properties 
Prop DLT Characteristics 
D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
F
le
x
ib
il
it
y
 
Interoperability. Ability to perform interchain exchanges and the ability to communicate with external services [52]. 
Level of Modularity. The extent to which modules of a DLT design can be exchanged (e.g., consensus mechanism) [5, 8, 
11, 62]. 
Maintainability. Degree of effectiveness and efficiency with which a product or system can be modified by the intended 
maintainers [9, 63]. 
Smart Contract Support. The degree of how well smart contracts are supported by a DLT design including expressive-
ness of supported programming languages [64] and availability of test and development environments [51, 64, 65]. 
Transaction Size. The presence of a fixed maximum size for a transaction [15]. 
L
o
A
1
 
Transparency. The ability to publicly view and trace an account’s holdings on a distributed ledger [7, 33, 43]. 
Unidentifiability. The state of being unidentifiable within a set of subjects [7, 33]. 
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
a
li
za
ti
o
n
 
Auditability. The ability of a distributed ledger to be audited regarding technical features and contents by an external 
party such as a state institution [33, 43]. 
Censorship-Resistance. The equal right of any user of the distributed ledger to submit transactions that are not altered or 
dropped by a third party [33, 45]. 
Compliance. Fulfillment of regulatory requirements or best practices [33, 56]. 
Development Activity on the DLT design. Amount of code updates for the DLT design and size and activity of the foun-
dation and community associated with the DLT design [9]. 
Openness. The extent to which new nodes can join the distributed ledger without being verified [15].  
Responsibility for Functionality. Existence of an enterprise, foundation, or organization that creates a DLT design’s 
underlying code and is responsible for its maintenance and functionality [19, 66]. 
1 Level of Anonymity 
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Development Flexibility vs. Security 
Smart Contract Support vs. Vulnerability Re-
sistance. Greater support of smart contracts enables 
more flexibility in developing applications on DLT. 
The more flexibility developers have when develop-
ing smart contracts, the more software errors (i.e., 
bugs) may occur, which harm vulnerability resistance 
of applications integrating such flawed smart con-
tracts [42]. 
Smart Contract Support vs. Vulnerability Re-
sistance. A greater support for expressive program-
ming languages (e.g., Java, Go, Python) creates more 
opportunities for third parties to write exploits that 
could compromise nodes within a distributed ledger 
(e.g., through a smart contract). Vulnerabilities in a 
DLT design’s environment (e.g., virtual machines 
hosting smart contracts) must be regularly secured 
and maintained to keep the distributed ledger secure. 
Level of Anonymity vs. Development Flexibility 
Unidentifiability vs. Maintainability. A higher 
level of anonymity is enabled by a public and unper-
missioned DLT design because nodes must not be 
verified before joining the distributed ledger. On the 
other hand, updates of DLT code must be updated by 
the majority of nodes in the whole network to keep 
compatibility and guarantee up-to-dateness [9]. It is 
hard to maintain the usually large number of nodes in 
public, unpermissioned distributed ledgers, which 
decreases the level of development flexibility. In con-
trast, permissioned, private DLT designs, are more 
flexible because each node must be verified and is 
identified before joining the distributed ledger. Since 
each participating node is known and the number of 
validating nodes in the distributed ledger is usually 
small, maintenance of the nodes is easier, which re-
sults in a higher level of development flexibility.  
Level of Anonymity vs. Performance 
Unidentifiability vs. Throughput. The less a net-
work is controlled by a central authority and the more 
nodes participate in the network, the higher the pos-
sible anonymity level for users. Therefore, public, 
unpermissioned distributed ledgers promise more 
anonymity than permissioned ones. In contrast, a 
smaller network with verified and identifiable nodes 
is considered as providing higher throughput because 
faster consensus algorithms can be used (e.g., Byzan-
tine Fault Tolerance). Unidentifiability can also be 
reached by applying additional processes like mixing 
and the use of new key-pairs per transaction [69]. 
These processes create overhead by preprocessing 
each transaction, which results in decreased transac-
tion validation speed. 
 
 
 
Level of Anonymity vs. Usability 
Unidentifiability vs. Support for Constrained De-
vices. To achieve unidentifiability there are two op-
tions. First, additional data structures can be used, 
which require additional storage size [7, 53]. Second, 
additional processes such as mixing can be applied 
resulting in additional demand for computational 
power. Both approaches for achieving unidentifiabil-
ity come at the cost of additional demands on compu-
tational power, which weakens the distributed ledg-
er’s support for constrained devices. 
Institutionalization vs. Level of Anonymity 
Auditability vs. Unidentifiability. Auditability re-
quires readability of transaction contents and the pos-
sibility to associate transaction contents with particu-
lar actors. As unidentifiability conceals actors, au-
ditability of user activities becomes very difficult or 
even impossible. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Our study presents 37 DLT characteristics that 
determine the suitability of DLT designs for specific 
use cases. Through the analysis of the DLT character-
istics we revealed 18 trade-offs between the DLT 
characteristics. Our findings shed light on interac-
tions between DLT characteristics that are inherent to 
DLT designs and elucidate several constraints on 
DLT designs. Based on our results, improvement of 
DLT designs can be taught in a more holistic way by 
both researchers and practitioners. A schematic illus-
tration of our findings can be found in Figure 3. Fur-
thermore, the explanation of the identified trade-offs 
supports practitioners in assessing suitability of DLT 
designs for use cases and future risks related to the 
choice of a DLT Design. 
Our results indicate that trade-offs between DLT 
properties are not of equal strength. While there are 
major conflicts between the DLT properties security 
and performance that are present in all DLT designs, 
there are also conflicts, whose importance varies with 
the specific use case. For instance, the trade-off be-
tween institutionalization and level of anonymity is 
only relevant if auditability is required. It is noticea-
ble that security directly conflicts with all DLT prop-
erties but level of anonymity. However, there are me-
diated trade-offs via performance, development flex-
ibility, or institutionalization. This implies that a high 
level of security comes at the cost of all other DLT 
characteristics. 
To make our findings even more comprehensible 
and easily applicable to DLT designs, we consolidat-
ed the identified trade-offs between DLT characteris-
tics into archetypes. 
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DLT Archetypes 
Maximum Usability DLT. This type of DLT offers 
a maximum level of usability to consumers. To make 
applications integrating DLT capable for constrained 
devices, a full replication of the ledger on each de-
vice should be avoided, for example, because of con-
strained storage sizes. To make a DLT design suita-
ble for constrained devices, DLT designs can use 
light nodes. Light nodes do not contribute to in-
creased availability or resilience of the distributed 
ledger because they do not store a full replication of 
the ledger and do not validate transactions. 
Maximum Development Flexibility DLT. Great 
development flexibility can be achieved through sup-
port of smart contracts that can be individually de-
ployed. The more expressive supported programming 
languages are, the more bugs may be exhibited by 
smart contracts. Smart contract code is hard to review 
and to test, especially, with respect to chained execu-
tion. Hence, smart contracts increase the risks for 
security breaches (e.g., The DAO attack [70]). 
Maximum Performance DLT. High performance 
requires a maximum number of transactions per sec-
onds. To achieve that goal, a minimal complexity of 
the employed consensus algorithm and encryption 
approaches is necessary. Additionally, a smaller 
number of validating nodes speeds up system 
throughput. Yet, a smaller number of nodes decreases 
security of a DLT and requires a higher level of trust 
for the nodes. This requires verification of nodes and, 
hence, the loss of their anonymity. Furthermore, par-
ticipating nodes do not need to contain a whole repli-
cation of the ledger. This type of DLT design can be 
used by even strongly-constrained devices, which 
lowers the number of replications of the system and 
consequently the system’s resilience. 
Maximum Anonymity DLT. To reach a high level 
of anonymity, additional processing of transactions is 
necessary (e.g., mixing, heavier encryption). These 
processes are time-consuming and require additional 
computational power, which slows down perfor-
mance. Great network size comes with a higher level 
of anonymity, but performance is deteriorated in 
block-based distributed ledgers. Furthermore, audita-
bility is limited or even impossible because transac-
tions cannot be traced back to the issuing user. 
Maximum Security DLT. A maximum of security 
in DLT is reached by increasing network size, ex-
cluding possibly fraudulent nodes, and reducing de-
velopment flexibility for smart contracts. These ap-
proaches contradict. For instance, the nodes’ level of 
anonymity is decreased to prevent attacks by fraudu-
lent nodes. 
Maximum Institutionalization DLT. Institutionali-
zation requires a high level of auditability and com-
pliance. Auditability comes with high transparency, 
which results in a low level of anonymity. The level 
of compliance of any system always depends on cur-
rent standards and regulations. Standards and regula-
tions can be changed, and systems must adapt to 
changes to retain their level of compliance. A basic 
characteristic of DLT designs is immutability. Hence, 
the later adaptation to changes concerning compli-
ance becomes hard. Therefore, a high level of immu-
tability rules out adaptations towards a high level of 
compliance without a decrease in integrity. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Our research aims to better understand trade-offs 
in DLT designs by providing a comprehensive list of 
DLT characteristics, a discussion on causes for 
emerging trade-offs, and the proposition of six arche-
types. We contribute to research and practice in sev-
eral ways. First, by discussing potential trade-offs in 
DLT designs, we provide a holistic view on the inter-
action and mutual interdependencies of DLT charac-
teristics. This holistic view is valuable to understand 
resulting constraints on the usefulness of specific 
DLT designs in different domains. This supports re-
search and practice in assessing DLT limitations and 
to gauge the risks resulting from the choice of a par-
ticular DLT design. Second, the presented six arche-
types can be used as a reference to obtain an impres-
sion of technical implications of a chosen DLT de-
sign and to ease the assessment of a DLT design’s 
suitability. 
However, current approaches for measuring DLT 
characteristics must be further developed to integrate 
the identified interdependencies and trade-offs to 
quantify their strength. Therefore, future research 
should examine methods for measuring impacts of 
DLT characteristics and the implications of different 
configurations of DLT characteristics. 
 
Figure 3. Schematic illustration of trade-offs be-
tween DLT properties 
SecurityPerformance
Level of
Anonym ity
Usability
Development
Flexibility
Inst itut io-
nalizat ion
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